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ABSTRACT
This paper models how the evolving field of pharmacogenomics (PG), which is the science of using
genomic markers to predict drug response, may impact drug development times, attrition rates, costs,
and the future returns to research and development (R&D). While there still remains an abundance
of uncertainty around how PG will impact the future landscape of pharmaceutical and biological
R&D, we identify several likely outcomes. We conclude PG has the potential to significantly reduce
both expected drug development costs (via higher probabilities of technical success, shorter clinical
development times, and smaller clinical trials) and returns. The impact PG has on expected returns
is partially mitigated by higher equilibrium prices, expedited product launches, and longer effective
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The Future of Drug Development: The Economics of Pharmacogenomics 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
 
The pace at which science is learning about human genetics and DNA and their 
influence on the evolution and treatment of human diseases is astounding.  One of the 
most promising avenues of this research is pharmacogenomics (PG), which is the science 
of using genomic markers to predict drug response and safety.  PG has the potential to 
identify  patients  at  high  risk  for  adverse  drug  events  (ADEs)  or  to  predict,  prior  to 
treatment, the efficacy of a drug for a particular patient or group of patients (based on the 
expression various genotypes).  To date, the most well-known and successful application 
of pharmacogenomics is the Her-2/neu diagnostic test for use with the biologic Herceptin 
(trastuzumab), which is a treatment for breast cancer.  Her-2/neu is an oncogene that is 
amplified and results in an over expression of the her-2/neu protein in a certain subset 
(25-30 percent) of advanced breast cancer patients.  The pharmacogenomic test for this 
oncogene identifies those women who over express her-2/neu and appear to respond to 
Herceptin, and for whom treatment is highly efficacious.  In contrast, patients without 
this  genetic  marker  respond  poorly  to  Herceptin.    While  other  examples  of 
pharmacogenomic applications also exist (e.g., Gleevec), this science is still relatively 
new and its potential applications are evolving rapidly.  To facilitate, and indeed keep up 
with, the advances in this new science, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
recently  (in  late  2003)  issued  draft  guidelines  for  the  industry  to  simultaneously 
encourage the use of pharmacogenomics and clarify how the FDA will evaluate these 
new types of data.     3 
Former FDA Commissioner, Mark McClellan, remarked at the release of these 
guidelines,  
 
“Pharmacogenomics holds great promise to shed scientific light on the often risky and 
costly process of drug development…we intend to do all we can to use it to promote the 
development of medicines. By providing practical guidance on how to turn the explosion 
of pharmacogenomic information into real evidence on new drugs, we are taking an 
important step toward that goal." (FDA News PO3-89, 2003) 
 
 
While the science behind this field has captured the imagination and attention of both the 
public and scientific community, the economic implications of pharmacogenomics are 
equally interesting; they will likely change the drug research and development (R&D) 
landscape dramatically.  The costs, risks, and returns to pharmaceutical and biological 
R&D may be greatly influenced by pharmacogenomics and this will have a direct impact 
on public health in the United States. This paper will carefully explore these issues and 
discuss their implications for the future of drug development. 
  Our  paper  is  structured  around  three  inter-related  economic  perspectives  of 
pharmacogenomics:  its  impact  on  costs,  returns  (net  revenues),  and  social  welfare.  
Specifically,  we  will  first  consider  how  pharmacogenomics  is  likely  to  impact  drug 
development costs, times, and attrition rates (all of which are related).  Second, we will 
consider the financial risks and returns associated with the use of pharmacogenomics in 
drug  development.  Third,  we  will  discuss  the  potential  welfare  implications  of 
pharmacogenomics in terms of its likely impact on patient access to new and existing 
drugs, firm incentives for R&D, and public health.  We will proceed as follows.     4 
Section II will describe the primary ways in which pharmacogenomics is likely to 
influence  the  cost  of  drug  development.    For  example,  relative  to  traditional  drug 
development, pharmacogenomics has the potential to reduce clinical trial costs (through 
smaller and possibly fewer clinical trials), drug attrition rates, and clinical developmental 
times.  We consider and discuss these and several other related issues in this section.  
Section  III  will  analyze  the  market  environment  for  products  developed  using  this 
technology.  Specifically, we will consider how product revenues may be affected when 
markets  are  segmented  using  pharmacogenomics.    For  products  developed  using 
pharmacogenomics there is likely to be a substantially different post-launch cash flow 
profile.  This section will build upon our previous work, which examined the market-
demand side issues of PG segmentation and product pricing, and consider the impact PG 
may  have  on  present  value  net  revenues.    More  specifically,  we  will  describe  how 
expedited  product  launches  and  longer  effective  patent  lives,  via  shorter  clinical 
development times, may, in certain circumstances, increase present value product cash 
flows despite a smaller, segmented patient population.  This section will also consider the 
net present value (NPV) profile of a pharmacogenomically-developed product versus a 
traditionally developed one.  This will be based, as will all our qualitative remarks in this 
paper, on a formal mathematical model we present in the appendix.  While generalized 
conclusions will not be drawn, the principle factors affecting a product’s NPV within 
both environments (a traditional development paradigm versus a pharmacogenomics one) 
will be discussed and some predictions will be offered with caution.  Section IV will 
conclude  the  paper  with  a  brief  discussion  on  the  potential  welfare  implications  of 
pharmacogenomics.   5 
 
Section II:  Pharmacogenomics and the Cost of Drug Development 
 
There  are  several  ways  in  which  pharmacogenomics  may  have  a  significant 
impact on the cost of developing new drugs, the most important of which are likely to be 
out-of-pocket clinical trials costs, clinical development times, and the attrition rate for 
developmental products.  The latter two categories impact the cost of drug development 
because  of  the  opportunity  cost  of  R&D  capital  and  the  cost  of  product  failures, 
respectively.  As  DiMasi,  Hansen,  and  Grabowski  (2003)  have  shown, these  two  cost 
categories account for the vast majority of the average cost of developing a new drug.  To 
be  certain,  there  are  other  important  ways  the  widespread  utilization  of 
pharmacogenomics might affect drug development costs. These include the additional 
costs associated with developing and using the pharmacogenomic diagnostic tests, issues 
relating to scale and scope economies in development and manufacturing, and the impact 
this  technology  may  have  on  the  growth  and  evolution  of  the  industry,  which  could 
impact financial risk and thus a firm’s cost of capital (Golec and Vernon, 2005). 
However, our focus will be upon the aforementioned three areas of clinical trials 
costs, development times, and attrition rates, where we think costs will be most affected.  
Much of the discussion in this section is based upon a formal economic model, which is 
presented in the appendix to this paper.   
 
Clinical Trial Sizes and the Out-of-Pocket Costs of Drug Development  
 
To frame our discussion around how the cost structure of a pharmacogenomic clinical 
program will differ from a traditional one, we must consider several key factors.  First,   6 
for simplicity, we assume that a diseased population has two types of patients: patients 
with a genetic marker for higher therapeutic efficacy and patients without this genetic 
marker. This binary assumption could easily be relaxed, but this would not affect our 
qualitative conclusions.  We let l represent the fraction of this population that carries the 
polymorphisms.    Furthermore,  we  assume  that  patients  without  the  marker  have  an 
efficacy  rate  of  e  and  patients  with  the  marker  have  the  efficacy  rate  of  e+d.    It  is 
straightforward to show that the efficacy rate in the pooled population (i.e., the entire 
population  that  includes  individuals  with  and  without  the  genetic  marker)  is  simply 
e+ld, or the weighted average efficacy in the entire diseased population.  For a clinical 
trial to demonstrate efficacy from a statistical perspective, a sufficient number of patients 
must be enrolled in the trial; a trial must be powered to detect the differential efficacy 
between the experimental treatment (new drug or biologic) and control (i.e., placebo).   In 
the appendix we derive the formula for N, which is the number of patients needed in the 
trial for a given level of statistical power.  We show that N is a decreasing function of 
efficacy; fewer patients need to be enrolled to statistically detect a greater efficacy level.  
This is of course intuitive.  The number N is also a function of a and b, the well-known 
statistical  parameters  used  in  powering  clinical  trials;  these  are,  respectively,  the 
probabilities of incorrectly rejecting the Null Hypothesis of no treatment effect (Type I 
error) and of failing to reject the Null Hypothesis when it is indeed false (Type II error).  
For a developmental compound with a known (or hypothesized) treatment effect (the 
Alternate Hypothesis), the quantity 1-b is the power of the trial, and it represents the 
probability that the Null Hypothesis will be correctly rejected.  Figure 1 below illustrates   7 
this  relationship  with  the  treatment  effect  being  the  horizontal  distance  between  the 
population means of the Null and Alternate Hypothesis sample distributions. 
 
Figure 1: Powering Clinical Trials: A Simple Illustration 
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All things held constant, as the sample size used in the clinical trial is increased, the two 
distributions in Figure 1 converge to spikes centered above their population means, and 
the power of the clinical trial (1-b) approaches 100 percent.  Of course, it is economically 
inefficient  (infeasible)  to  power  clinical  trials  at  such  high  levels  (near  100  percent) 
because of the extremely large sample sizes required.  
  The obvious benefit of a clinical development program that enrolls only high-
response-rate individuals is that fewer patients will need to be enrolled in the clinical 
trials to demonstrate a statistically significant treatment effect. Because the variable cost 
of a clinical trial is driven largely by the number of patients enrolled in that trial (personal 
correspondence, Pfizer Clinical Development), we approximate the percentage reduction   8 
in  variable,  out-of-pocket  clinical  trial  costs
1  (when  following  a  pharmacogenomic 
development program instead of a traditional one) by the ratio  T N N / D , where  N D  is the 
difference between T N , the of patients needed to detect the effect e+ld, and  G N , the 
number of patients needed to detect the effect e+d: 
 
) , , , , ( b a d l e f N N N G T = D = -                   (1) 
 
Because clinical trials, and especially Phase III clinical trials, represent the vast majority 
of  variable  out-of-pocket  clinical  development  costs  (DiMasi  et  al.  2003),  the  ratio 
T N N / D  serves as a rough first approximation of the reduction in these costs associated 
with following a pharmacogenomic development approach (relative to the same product 
developed  following  the  traditional  drug  development  approach)
2.    In  the  following 
section and in the  appendix we consider how the length of the  clinical development 
program will impact the out-of-pocket costs by assuming costs can be modeled on a per-
patient, per-unit-of-time basis.  Finally, it should be noted that there are also fixed costs 
associated with clinical trials and clinical development, but data on the distribution across 
these two cost categories are not publicly available.  The larger the proportion of clinical 
development costs that are variable costs, the greater the impact a pharmacogenomic 
development program will have on the out-of-pocket cost of drug development.  We 
focus our analyses on variable costs exclusively. 
                                                 
1 This analysis applies primarily to Phase III clinical trials because the smaller Phase I and II trials are 
focused largely on issues of drug metabolism and dosing.  However, because Phase III is by far the largest 
and most costly phase (DiMasi et al., 2003 estimate that Phase III clinical costs are approximately 70 
percent of out-of-pocket clinical development costs) it seems reasonable to focus on these trials. 
2 We are not presently modeling the possibility that in addition to smaller clinical trials fewer clinical trials 
may be required.  This would result in pharmacogenomic development programs having even lower costs 
relative to traditional development programs.   9 
  To  illustrate  this  through  a  simple  example,  and  to  demonstrate  the 
interrelationship  among  some  of  the  key  model  parameters,  consider  the  clinical 
development program for a drug under both a pharmacogenomic development paradigm 
and a traditional one.  We assume that the clinical trials are powered such that a = 0.05 
and b = 0.10.  We further assume that the efficacy rate for patients without the genetic 
marker for a high response rate is 10 percent (i.e. e =0.10) and the incremental efficacy 
for patients with the genetic marker, d, are 0.05, 0.10, and 0.15.  
Table  1  reports  the  percentage  reductions  in  variable,  out-of-pocket  clinical 
development costs for different values of l (the proportion of patients with the genetic 
marker) and d (the incremental efficacy associated with having the genetic marker).  The 
values in Table 1 are conservative approximations for out-of-pocket development costs 
because we are not modeling the temporal aspect of drug development and how PG will 
impact the length of clinical development programs.  The forthcoming sections of this 
paper and the appendix consider these factors in detail. The appendix also discusses the 
issue of running separate trials for high rate responders (patients with the genetic marker) 
and low rate responders (patients without the genetic marker). 
 
Table 1: Clinical Development Cost Reductions Associated with  
PG for Different Values of l l l l and d d d d (e e e e = 10 percent) 
 
  d = 0.05 d = 0.05 d = 0.05 d = 0.05        d = 0.10 d = 0.10 d = 0.10 d = 0.10        d = 0.15 d = 0.15 d = 0.15 d = 0.15       
 l  l  l  l = 0.1  33.5%  50.6%  61.0% 
l l l l = 0.3  26.4%  40.2%  49.1% 
l l l l = 0.5  19.0%  29.4%  36.4% 
l l l l = 0.7  11.6%  18.1%  22.6% 
l  l  l  l = 0.9  3.9%  6.2%  7.8% 
 
   10 
The  results  in  Table  1  are  striking,  and  suggest  that  for  clinical  trials,  and  clinical 
development programs to the extent there costs are proportional to clinical trial costs, PG 
has the potential to significantly reduce out-of-pocket costs.  In support of this prediction, 
it is worth noting that a major pharmaceutical firm recently reported redesigning a $10 
million clinical trial in order to utilize genomic markers to predict drug response; the PG 
trial cost the firm only $500,000 to complete (Mattingly, 2004). 
While  this  simple  exercise  provides  some  insight  into  the  impact  that 
pharmacogenomics may have on the average out-of-pocket clinical development costs for 
new drugs, there are a number of factors that were not considered.  For example, we do 
not model the possibility that following a pharmacogenomics development approach may 
require fewer numbers of clinical trials.  Nor do we model how out-of-pocket pre-clinical 
costs may be affected.  There are also certain to be costs associated with the development 
and study of pharmacogenomic diagnostic tools.  However, as stated in the beginning of 
this section, the most significant ways pharmacogenomics is likely to impact average 
drug development costs is through its effect on drug development times and attrition 
rates.  This seems plausible because the costs associated with product failures and the 
opportunity cost of investment capital account for over four-fifths of the total average 
cost of developing a new drug (DiMasi et al., 2003).  Nevertheless, some intuition around 
how out-of-pocket clinical developments costs might be affected is necessary to consider; 
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Clinical Development Times and Expedited Product Launches 
 
The Herceptin and Her-2/neu diagnostic example discussed in the introduction may shed 
light on the likely impact pharmacogenomics will have on average drug development 
times.  Because of the compelling evidence in support of Herceptin’s effectiveness in 
patients with an over expressed Her-2/neu oncogene, the FDA gave Herceptin a fast-track 
designation with expedited review for the treatment of metastatic breast cancer; within 
4.5 months of submission (September 1998), Herceptin and HercepTest (the diagnostic 
test used to identify over expressed Her-2/neu oncogenes) were approved for marketing.  
Of  course,  the  fact  that  Herceptin  and  HercepTest  were  being  developed  for  a  very 
serious  form  of  cancer  also  contributed  to  the  fast-track  designation,  but  it  seems 
plausible that the expediency with which approval was granted was also influenced by 
the compelling clinical evidence that the her-2/neu diagnostic was able to quickly identify 
patients likely to benefit from treatment.  Most importantly, the high level of therapeutic 
efficacy within patients with over expressed Her-2/neu oncogenes made it possible to 
rapidly  demonstrate  a  clinically  and  statistically  significant  survival  benefit  from 
Herceptin therapy. 
  Theoretically,  therefore,  it  seems  reasonable  to  postulate  that  smaller  (and 
possibly fewer) clinical trials may be undertaken and completed more rapidly than larger 
(and possibly more) clinical trials.  Enrolling a smaller number of patients should, ceteris 
paribus, take less time—especially when smaller numbers of patients per trial are coupled 
with  a  smaller  number  of  clinical  trials.    This  may  be  the  case  because  in  a  more 
efficacious  subpopulation  of  patients  clinically  significant  treatment  effects  can  be 
demonstrated  more  rapidly  than  would  be  the  case  in  a  population  comprised  of   12 
responders and non-responders (or responders and less-efficacious responders).  It is not 
uncommon  for  clinical  trials  to  be  terminated  earlier  than  planned  because  of 
unexpectedly favorable treatment effects.  This, however, occurs because the treatment 
effect was underestimated in clinical trial design, and as  a result the trial was “over 
powered.” Thus, while  this consideration is useful in explaining why higher efficacy 
levels  (in  subpopulations  with  genetic  markers  for  high-rate  responders)  may  lead  to 
shorter  clinical  development  times,  our  model  assumes  perfect  information  on  the 
treatment  effect  a  priori,  such  that  the  benefit  of  higher  efficacy  comes  via  smaller 
clinical  trials  (i.e.,  DN  from  the  previous  section).    This  should  be  kept  in  mind 
throughout the forthcoming discussion because it is one possible link between smaller 
clinical trails and shorter development times.   
Other factors that should be considered include whether  a clinical program is 
developing a product for high-efficacy responders and low-efficacy responder separately 
(the appendix discusses why this will be uneconomical relative to a program that simply 
pools the two groups and develops a product for the pooled population); the cost and time 
associated with developing a pharmacogenomic test; and the extent to which clinical trial 
enrollment may take longer because of the smaller proportion of the diseased population 
carrying  the  genetic  marker  (i.e.,  l),  all  else  held  constant.    We  model  the  reduced 
clinical development time associated with a pharmacogenomic development program as 
DT, where DT = TT – TG   (where TT and TG denote average clinical development times 
under  a  traditional  drug  development  approach  and  pharmacogenomic  approach, 
respectively); DT should, in theory, be a function of the reduced clinical trial sizes, DN, 
(and  number  of  clinical  trials),  the  proportion  of  the  disease  population  carrying  the   13 
genetic marker for high-response, l, and the time associated with developing a reliable 
pharmacogenomic test or diagnostic, t.  Mathematically, we represent this as follows, 
where the new variable,q , is a proportionality scaling factor designed to capture the fact 
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g T                 (2)  
  
Unlike equation (1), which (per the appendix) precisely mapped the relationship 
between DN/NT and the other model variables, the function g in (2) is only a general 
specification.  The  appendix  employs  several  proportionality  and  economies  of  scale 
assumptions,  but  these  are  somewhat  speculative  in  nature.  It  is  probable  that  DT  is 
increasing in q  and DN/NT, but decreasing in l and t.  While most of these relationships 
are  quite  intuitive,  the  link  between  DT  and  l  deserves  some  explanation  and 
clarification.    Enrolling  patients  in  clinical  trails  can  be  a  time  consuming  process 
because patients must be screened for inclusion (exclusion) criteria.  As l approaches 0 
(i.e., the proportion of patients with the relevant genetic marker gets very small), it may 
be quite time consuming to screen and enroll only those patients with the relevant genetic 
marker because they represent an increasingly small fraction of the diseased population 
the clinical trial seeks to study.  A simple example will illustrate this point.  If 25 percent 
of  breast  cancer  patients  carry  a  particular  genetic  marker  for  (i.e.,  l=0.25)  for  high 
efficacy, then on average 4 patients must be screed for every one patient that is eligible 
for the clinical trial.  This number increases to 10 patients per enrollee if only 10 percent   14 
of breast cancer patients carry the genetic marker (i.e., l=0.10), and 100 if only 1 percent 
carry the marker (i.e., l=0.01)
3.  Simply put, the number of potential enrollees that must 
be screened, on average, to obtain an additional clinical trial patient is 1/l, which grows 
very  rapidly  for  small  values  of  l.    Thus,  the  influence  l will  have  on  clinical 
development times via this effect will be strongest when l is very small.  When l is not 
very  small,  say  for  example  25  percent,  as  in  the  Herceptin  example,  then  it  seems 
probable  that  this  effect  will  be  dominated  by  factors  that  tend  to  reduce  clinical 
development  times  (i.e.,q   and  DN/NT).    The  additional  time  required  to  study  and 
develop pharmacogenomic diagnostic tests, t, will also influence development times, but 
we suspect the net effect will be a significant reduction in clinical development times.  
Indeed, some recent estimates suggest that pharmacogenomic-based clinical development 
programs  will  average  3-5  years  in  length  compared  to  10-12  years  for  traditional 
programs (Quintiles Transnational, 2004).    
  Before proceeding to our discussion on how pharmacogenomics, both through 
improved efficacy (via genetic targeting) and reduced adverse events (via screening), will 
likely impact the technical success of drug development (and thus the expected cost of 
drug development), it is worthwhile to illustrate graphically how drug development using 
pharmacogenomics  may  be  different  from  traditional  drug  development  within  the 
context of the analysis presented in this section and the last.  Figure 2 captures these 
fundamental differences.   
                                                 
3 We do not consider this to be a major factor in our model of out-of-pocket development costs because 
screening patients for genetic markers typically involves only taking a blood sample to test the individuals 
DNA.  Of course, as will be discussed later in the paper, there are very significant costs associated with 
clinical development program length (due to the opportunity cost of investment capital), but in the previous 





Figure 2: The Principle Ways Pharmacogenomics May Influence 














It is worth emphasizing that Figure 2 depicts only out-of-pocket cash flows and 
not expected cash flows (which incorporate the probabilities of advancing through the 
different stages of clinical development).  If pharmacogenomic development programs 
increase  the  probability  of  technical  success  (over  those  associated  with  traditional 
development programs) at each development stage, then expected clinical development 
costs per drug developed will be proportionately even smaller than is illustrated in Figure 
2.  Of course, the total expected cost of developing a new drug must also consider the 
firm’s opportunity cost of investment capital; shorter development times will thus lower 





















































µ DN/NT  16 
estimates of the expected cost of bring a new drug to market find that these opportunity 
costs of investment capital account for approximately half of the total cost (DiMasi et al., 
2003).  We turn to these issues next and develop a more formal model of the impact 
pharmacogenomics will have on drug development costs. 
 




There are important ways pharmacogenomics may affect the probability of a new drug 
advancing through the developmental pipeline and gaining FDA approval.  The two most 
fundamental are related to what are often referred to as the first and second hurdles of 
drug development: safety and efficacy.  The focus of our paper thus far has centered on 
the  higher  therapeutic  efficacy  in  a  genetically  identified  subpopulation  of  patients; 
however, an equally promising (if not more so) opportunity for pharmacogenomics lies in 
the safety arena.  Identifying patients at high risk for adverse drug events (ADEs) could 
salvage a developmental product from program termination.  Consider Figure 3 below, 
which depicts a hypothetical population of diseased patients.   
 













Not Safe to Enroll  17 
If  the  ADE  is  a  particularly  dangerous  one,  or  even  fatal  one,  then  without  a  priori 
information on which patients are at risk for this ADE (i.e., the ADE patient subgroup) 
the product has no hope of ever reaching the market and benefiting those patients who 
could safely take the drug.  However, with the technology of pharmacogenomics, there is 
now a much greater chance that such a product could be brought to market.  Thalidomide, 
the notorious 1950’s drug that was indicated for morning sickness in pregnant women 
and that resulted in birth defects (and which was the impetus to the 1962 Kefauver-Harris 
Amendments)  received  FDA  approval  in  1998  for  the  treatment  of  a  particular  skin 
condition and is currently being investigated for several other indications, including use 
in treating certain types of cancer (MayoClinic.com, 2005).   While this example (at least 
currently) does not entail the application of pharmacogenomics, it does clearly illustrate 
the benefits (and high stakes) associated with successfully identifying patients at risk for 
severe ADEs. For years it was unthinkable that Thalidomide might one day be back on 
the market.  Regarding the application of pharmacogenomics in this capacity, current 
research shows there are already a number of actual and potential applications (Phillips et 
al., 2001). 
  To more formally demonstrate how pharmacogenomics is likely to reduce the 
expected  cost  of  drug  development  through  higher  probabilities  of  technical  success, 
consider the following expression for the average capitalized cost of bringing a new drug 
to market: 
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    (3)   18 
Equation (3) is based on a discrete, n-period fixed model of drug development where the 
capitalized out-of-pocket drug development cost per period is denoted by Ct, and the 
probability the product will advance from one period to the next is denoted by pt (with p0 
assumed to be equal to unity).  The Ct terms may be thought of as the capitalized discrete-
time counterparts to the continuous-time costs shown in Figure 2.  
Equation  (3)  depicts  the  structure  of  the  DiMasi  et  al.  (2003)  method  of 
calculating the average cost of developing a new drug (with a cost of capital equal to 
zero).   It is straightforward to see from (3) how expected development costs decrease in 
pt.  That is, as the probabilities of technical success increase at each development stage, 
average  expected  development  costs  per  successful  new  drug  decrease.    A  simple 
example will illustrate this important point.  Consider the simple 3-stage development 
model shown below in Figure 4. 
 

























p=0.80  19 
If failure or success is determined only after all out-of-pocket costs associated with that 
development stage have been incurred, and if we assume the cost of investment capital is 
zero,  then  it  is  easy  to  show  how  improved  technical  success  lowers  expected  drug 
development costs per drug.  To show this assume pre-clinical development costs are $0 
(for simplicity), clinical development programs cost $50 million dollars, and all FDA 
submissions  and  New  Drug  Applications  (NDAs)  cost  $10  million.    Under  these 
assumptions, and based on the technical success probabilities shown in Figure 4, the 
expected cost of development for a given developmental drug is: 
 
E[Cost] =  000 , 000 , 11 $ 000 , 000 , 10 $ 5 . 0 2 . 0 000 , 000 , 50 $ 2 . 0 = ´ ´ + ´      (4) 
 
To  calculate  the  expected  cost  per  drug  successfully  developed  (because  the  cost  of 
bringing  a  new  drug  to  market  must  include  the  costs  associated  with  failed  drug 
development programs), we simply divide this expected cost by the probability that a 
drug will actually make it to market: 
 
E[Cost] per Successful Drug =  000 , 500 , 137 $
08 . 0
000 , 000 , 11 $
=       (5) 
 
Let us now consider the expected cost per drug if the probabilities of technical success 
improve, holding everything else constant.  Specifically, we assume that the probability 
of technical success in pre-clinical development increases from 0.20 to 0.30 and that the 
probability of clinical development success increases  from 0.50 to 0.80.  We further 
assume the probability of FDA approval remains the same.  The expected cost per drug 
developed is now the following: 
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E[Cost] per Successful  Drug =  000 , 625 , 90 $
192 . 0
000 , 400 , 17 $
=       (6) 
 
Thus, as the probabilities of technical success increase, the expected development cost 
per drug necessarily declines
4.  
  In the preceding example we held constant out-of-pocket development costs and 
clinical  development  times.    However,  as  we  have  already  shown,  it  is  likely  that 
pharmacogenomics development programs will involve both smaller out-of-pocket costs 
and shorter clinical development times, as shown previously in Figure 2.  These two 
factors,  when  combined  with  higher  probabilities  of  technical  success,  reduce  the 
expected cost per new drug even further, relative to a traditional drug development.   
In  sum,  the  preponderance  of  evidence  from  our  analyses  suggests  that 
pharmacogenomics will likely reduce the average cost of drug development in a very 
significant manner in the future.  But what will pharmacogenomics mean for drugs once 
they reach the market?  The general sentiment expressed among industry experts and 
insiders  is  that  this  technology  will  segment  markets,  and  all  but  do  away  with  the 
blockbuster  model  of  drug  development  that  has  been  the  driving  force  behind  the 
incentives for R&D investment in the pharmaceutical industry (Grabowski and Vernon, 
2000, Vernon, 2003; 2005, Giaccotto, Santerre, and Vernon, 2005).  We will turn to this 
and other related issues next. 
 
                                                 
4 It is worth noting that the expected development costs associated with any given program, all else held 
constant, will increase because it increases the likelihood that later-stage development costs will be 
incurred.  For example, if the probabilities of technical success in our current example were all raised to 
unity, such that there was a 100 percent chance of advancing all the way through development and gaining 
FDA approval, then the expected cost (which is not really an expectation given this perfect certainty) would 
be $60,000,000.  This would also be the cost per drug because of the aforementioned perfect certainty of 
success.  The key point is that the expected cost per successful drug will always decrease in these technical 
probabilities.   21 
Section III:  Pharmacogenomics, Market Segmentation, and Drug Revenues 
 
 
In this section of the paper we undertake a fundamental review of the post-launch 
economics  behind  pharmacogenomics.    We  will  base  some  of  our  analyses  on  our 
previously work in this area (Vernon, Hughen, Johnson, and Trujillo, 2005).  Danzon and 
Towse  (2002)  also  provide  an  excellent  overview  of  these  and  other  related  issues.  
Because the pharmaceutical industry’s core business is the innovation, development, and 
marketing of new drugs, pharmacogenomic diagnostic testing will be attractive to drug 
makers if it can support this business.  We will explore this issue within the context of a 
simple  economic  analysis  of  increased  pharmaceutical  market  segmentation  through 
pharmacogenomic test development (following our approach in the last section, we will 
continue to model pharmacogenomics markers in a binary manner).  Specifically, we 
address the sub-segmenting issue by reviewing how pharmaceutical drug revenues may 
be affected in both responder and non-responder segments.  We illustrate this first in a 
simple, single-period model, and then consider several dynamic extensions.   
The impact of pharmacogenomic-driven market segmentation on price, market 
size,  and  present  value  net  revenues  will  be  shown  to  depend  on  such  factors  as 
consumers’ (e.g., individuals, managed care plans, or national governments) willingness-
to-pay for new products, the proportions of responders and non-responders, and the costs 
of treating the underlying disease for which the new drug is indicated.  Underpinning our 
analysis  is  the  cost-effectiveness  framework  widely  used  by  payers  for  determining 
whether a product will be covered and reimbursed for use by its enrollees or citizens for 
national  health  insurance  systems.  Cost-effectiveness  analysis  (CEA)  has  come  to   22 
predominate  in  determining  the  value  of  new  technology  as  it  entails  an  acceptable 
combination  of  economic  theory,  medical  information,  and  empirical  flexibility  
(Eisenberg,  1989;  Sloan,  1995;  Drummond  et  al.,  1997).  Most  of  Western  Europe, 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand use explicit or implicit forms of CEA (Jommi, 2001; 
Gosling, 2000). The United Kingdom has the most stringent and formal CEA review 
embodied  in  their  National  Institute  for  Clinical  Excellence  (NICE),  which  was 
introduced in 1999 to ensure that healthcare funding is used efficiently and that policies 
on  treatment  choice  are  consistent  across  the  country,  and  to  evaluate  the  cost-
effectiveness of pharmaceutical products deemed to significantly increase health system 
expenditures (Atkinson, 2002).  NICE issues criteria by which it will use CEA to conduct 
these evaluations for public review, and uses a £30,000 per quality-adjusted-life-year 
(QALY) threshold, or the maximum the payer is willing-to-pay per QALY. 
While CEA allows payers to have a formal method for determining value for new 
technology, it also allows firms to determine their customer’s maximum willingness-to-
pay.  By decomposing a new drug’s price from the total costs of the intervention, firms 
may gauge the potential future price of their developmental products.  In this section of 
the paper we will consider how pharmacogenomic tests will divide a market into two 
segments, responders and non-responders, based on the efficacies in each, and how this 
segmentation  will  impact  future  drug  price  and  market  size.   We  then  consider  how 
pharmacogenomics will impact present value net revenues by extending this model into a 
dynamic setting.     23 
While  our  approach  will  be  primarily  based  on  this  simple  framework,  we 
acknowledge that pharmacogenomics may increase a drug’s value in numerous other 
important ways.  We will discuss these at the end of this section.  
 
Cost-Effectiveness, Pharmacogenomics, and Drug Prices 
 
If  one  assumes  that  payers  use  cost-effectiveness  standards  (explicitly  or 
implicitly) when evaluating new therapeutic technologies, insofar as pricing is concerned, 
then  it  is  quite  easy  to  develop  a  simple  model  capable  of  illuminating  the  key 
deterministic relationships that influence both price and total revenues under traditional 
and  pharmacogenomic  development  programs.    In  recent  years  there  has  been 
considerable growth in the use of cost-effectiveness analyses to make decisions about 
covering and reimbursing new pharmaceutical and biotechnology products.  The future 
appears to hold an even larger role for these analyses, even in the U.S. market, which has 
traditionally  not  relied  on  these  methods.    The  passage  of  the  2003  Medicare 
Modernization Act (MMA), and the Medicare Drug Benefit contained therein (which 
goes into effect in January 2006), will likely exert significant pressure to expand the use 
of these methods to ensure good value for money and to contain costs.   
To begin, we consider a static population of q patients with diseasex, for which 
there  is  currently  no  treatment.    As  in  the  last  section,  we  assume  that  the  fraction, 
l, represents  the  proportion  of  patients  with  a  genetic  marker  for  high  therapeutic 
efficacy, i.e., e + d compared to e for patients without the marker (and e+ld for the entire, 
or pooled, population). We assume there are two cost components to disease x:  f c , which 
is the cost of the disease independent of treatment success (fixed costs), and  v c , which is   24 
a cost that is not incurred if treatment is successful (variable costs).  Both costs are 
strictly positive. Finally, we assume pharmaceuticals are priced such that they satisfy the 
following cost-effectiveness criterion with equality: D(Costs)/D(Efficacy)  W £ , where W 
is the payers’ (consumers’) maximum willingness to pay per unit efficacy (e.g., £30,000 
per QALY).   The  costs considered in most cost-effectiveness  analyses  include direct 
costs such as drug acquisition costs, doctor visits, hospitalizations costs, among others; 
indirect costs such as time lost from work and family caregiver help are also typically 
incorporated.    After  differencing  the  costs  associated  with  treatment  using  the  new 
technology (drug) from the costs associated with the current (standard of care) treatment, 
this  marginal  cost  is  compared  (divided  by)  the  incremental  efficacy  of  the  new 
technology over the current technology; this generates a measure of the cost per unit of 
effectiveness, which is the cost effectiveness ratio.   
Given  these  assumptions  it  is  straightforward,  if  somewhat  algebraically 
cumbersome, to evaluate the total revenues under a traditional development program and 
a segmented, pharmacogenomic development program (the appendix does this in a step-
by-step fashion).  Under a traditional development program there is no segmentation, and 
thus a larger market to serve; however, under a pharmacogenomic development paradigm 
there is a higher level of therapeutic efficacy, and thus from a cost-effectiveness (or value 
for money) perspective, a higher equilibrium price.
5  It can be shown that the latter effect 
                                                 
5 We do not explicitly consider the possibility that a firm will develop the product separately for responders 
(the fraction l of the population) and non-responders (or more precisely low-rate responders). The 
appendix considers this possibility and shows how if firms could price discriminate based of the cost-
effectiveness of the drug in each market segment, then revenues under a segmenting/pharmacogenomics 
development approach would yield equivalent revenues to that of a non-segmenting/traditional 
development approach.  However, the challenges to preventing inter-market arbitrage would be 
considerable (Vernon et. al., 2005); thus, we focus our analyses on a pharmacogenomic development 
program that develops a product exclusively for the proportion of the population carrying the genetic 
marker for a high response rate.     25 
(higher prices) will never offset the former effect (a smaller market), and specifically that 
the ratio, F, of the revenues under the two development programs, RG and RT, for the 
traditional and pharmacogenomic programs, respectively, collapses to a function of only 















G                 (7) 
 
 
This relationship is shown in Figure 5 whereF is on the vertical (or z-) axis with 
range on the intervalF ] 1 , 0 [ Î ,  l is on the x-axis and has the domain ] 1 , 0 [ Î l , and d is 
on the y-axis with domain ] 9 . 0 , 0 [ ] 1 , 0 [ = - Î e d .  We arbitrarily set e equal to a value of 
0.10 to generate this three-dimensional space. 
 
 
Figure 5: The Impact of Pharmacogenomics on Drug Revenues in a  
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Obviously, Figure 5 could be reproduced for any non-marker efficacy level, e.  As 
intuition suggests and as Figure 5 clearly shows, small values of d  and  l result in less 
favorable revenue outcomes for a pharmacogenomic development approach relative to 
larger values of d  and l , all else considered.  We will use our measure of F in the next 
section when we consider several dynamic extensions of the current model. 
 
Expedited Product Launches, Effective Patent Lives, and Present Value Net Revenues 
 
While our simple example shows that in a static, one-period model drug revenues are 
likely to be less following a pharmacogenomics approach to drug development, a more 
relevant issue is the impact this technology will have on present value net revenues.  Two 
factors are likely to work together to mitigate the static, one period reduction in revenues 
of 1- F percent: the time value of money associated with an expedited product launch of 
DT years (from the previous section) and a longer effective patent life, which is a direct 
consequence  of  an  expedited  product  launch  (effective  patent  life  is  equal  to  the 
remaining patent period on a new drug or biologic at the time it is launched).  Because 
generic entry post-patent expiration results in a significant cannibalization of brand sales 
(see,  for  example,  Grabowski  and  Vernon,  2000),  the  value  of  an  expedited  product 
launch does more than simply shift cash flow profile of a product to the left (see Figure 6 












Figure 6: An Economic Model of the Impact of Pharmacogenomics on  













Figure  6  is  intended  only  to  illustrate  these  aforementioned  points  in  a  very 
general  manner.    There  is,  however,  a  direct  link  between  the  static,  single  period, 
revenue model developed earlier. This link is depicted by the horizontal distance between 
the two net revenue curves, which should be (after controlling for temporal shifts in the 
two life-cycle net revenue curves) proportional to 1-F.  This is similar in many respects 
to  our  analyses  and  argument  for  why  out-of-pocket  development  costs  for  a 
pharmacogenomic  development  program  will  be  less  than  those  of  a  traditional 
development program in proportion to the quantity DN/NT.   
The relevant question is the following: is the scaling (down) effect associated with 
a  segmented  market  (1-F) more  than  offset  by  the  favorable  economic  effects  of  an 
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expedited  market  launch?    That  is,  are  present  value  net  revenues  greater  under  a 
pharmacogenomic development model or the traditional one?  It seems obvious that the 
answer  to  this  question  will  depend  on  the  parameters  values  for  e, d, l, and  DT.  A 
definitive answer is not readily available, but it seems likely that the larger the values of 
F and DT, the more probable it is that a pharmacogenomic development program will 
generate  higher  present  value  net  revenues  relative  to  a  traditional  program  of  drug 
development.  The appendix considers this question in greater detail.   
Of course, the ultimate question one would like to answer deals not with present 
value  net  revenues,  but  with  the  project’s  net  present  value  (NPV)  under  both 
development paradigms.  To consider this we must also incorporate the probabilities of 
technical success under both drug development approaches.  Because it seems likely from 
our earlier analyses and discussion that pharmacogenomics will reduce the expected costs 
of drug development through smaller and possibly fewer clinical trials, expedited market 
launches, and higher probabilities of technical success, it seems probable that, at least for 
a  proportion  of  products,  the  NPV  associated  with  a  pharmacogenomic  development 
program will be higher than that associated with a traditional development program.  This 
will be particularly true, as stated above, for drugs or biologics that are associated with 
large values of F and DT.  Expressed more formally, we may write: 
 
NPVG-NPVT = D(NPV) = h[DN, DT, F]            (8) 
 
In our model, D(NPV) is increasing in DN and DT and decreasing in F.  For values of 
F close  to  and  approaching  unity,  it  seems  very  likely  that  D(NPV)  >  0,  and   29 
pharmacogenomics  will  thus  lead  to  more  financially  attractive  R&D  investment 
opportunities. 
While our economic models of pharmacogenomics, and their expected impact on 
both clinical development and drug revenues, are quite general, the considerations they 
have identified seem to suggest that, on net, the financial benefits could easily exceed the 
costs.  While this may not be true for all cases, it is certain to be the case in many 
circumstances.    This  being  said,  however,  there  remain  several  other  commercial 
opportunities not captured in our model that warrant attention prior to concluding this 
paper with a brief discussion on the future welfare implication of pharmacogenomics.   
 
Other Commercial Considerations and Opportunities for Pharmacogenomics 
 
There are a number of ways pharmacogenomics may enhance the commercial 
opportunities for a new or existing pharmaceutical or biologic.  In terms of improving the 
value of marketed drugs, products could be offensively or defensively positioned through 
the  strategic  inclusion  of  additional  efficacy  information  on  their  labels.  
Pharmacogenomic tests associated with a product may also be used or act as a signal of 
quality to physician prescriber-users or regulators by indicating an additional level of 
scientific rigor behind the stated efficacy of a drug, therein reducing related uncertainty 
as to its utility in the provider’s mind.   
Other  potential  means  of  improving  drug  value  through  pharmacogenomics 
include reducing product liability through developing a more specific, validated label or 
resuscitating a withdrawn drug by developing the ability to identify prospectively adverse 
reactants (as discussed in detail in the previous section of this paper).  Similarly, there is   30 
the possibility that pharmacogenomics could prospectively create new or expand existing 
markets at a more rapid rate.  The latter case may hold where a population could be 
screened as being at risk for a disease and thus a candidate for early, preventive therapy.  
Prospective  patients  with  hereditary  diseases  such  as  Alzheimer’s  or  prostate  cancer 
could be screened and potentially initiate therapy years earlier than they otherwise would 
have with current screening and diagnostic technology.  It is also possible that additional 
revenues may be earned through off-label prescribing to patients not carrying a genetic 
marker  for  high  efficacy.    While  our  model  does  not  include  these  commercial 
opportunities, it seems likely that they will significantly enhance the economic benefits 
(to firms and consumers) associated with pharmacogenomics.   
   
Section IV:  Incentives for R&D, Welfare Considerations, and Conclusions 
 
 
To  more  fully  gauge  the  likely  impact  of  pharmacogenomics  on  the  future  of  drug 
development, it is necessary to understand how this technology will shape the financial 
incentives of firms in the pharmaceutical industry.  In particular, if this technology has a 
positive impact on the expected financial returns to investment in R&D, as we suspect it 
one day will, then R&D investment in the future with will increase as a result, and so too 
will innovation.  The direct link between R&D investment and innovation is difficult to 
predict,  but  recent  research  on  the  historical  mapping  between  R&D  investment  and 
innovation  suggests  that  this  is  a  highly  productive  investment  for  society,  one  that 
generates considerable social value in terms of improved life expectancy, quality of life, 
and the eradication of many diseases.  For example, econometric research by Lichtenberg 
(2002) has recently estimated that for every $1,345 invested in pharmaceutical R&D, the   31 
U.S. gains approximately one human life year.  Given the fact that recent estimates for 
the  value  of  a  U.S.  life  year  range  between  $100,000  and  $160,000  (Cutler  and 
McClellan, 2001; Murphy and Topel, 2003), the social returns to increased future levels 
of industry R&D will almost certainly generate benefits greatly in excess of costs.  This is 
consistent with research that suggests the United States is currently under investing in 
medical  and  pharmaceutical  R&D  (Murphy  and  Topel,  2003)
6.    As  a  result,  any 
significant change in the pharmaceutical R&D landscape that affects the incentives to 
invest  in  R&D  will  have  important  implications  for  social  welfare  in  the  U.S.  
Pharmacogenomics,  it  seems,  has  the  potential  to  increase  the  future  incentives  for 
investment in R&D, and this will mean improved access to new pharmaceutical  and 
biologic innovations for many Americans.  Moreover, pharmacogenomics offers the very 
real potential for more rapid access to drugs via expedited market launches and higher 
probabilities of technical success (especially in the sense that this technology could result 
in  products  being  brought  to  market  that  otherwise  would  have  been  terminated  in 
development because of severe adverse reactions among a small number of patients).  
While there still remain numerous challenges associated with this technology, our review 
of the basic economics behind pharmacogenomics suggest that once these challenges 
have been surmounted, the future for drug development, both in terms of the financial 
awards  associated  with  it,  and  in  terms  of  the  social  benefits  it  will  impart,  is  very 




                                                 
6 The reasons why there may be a socially suboptimal level (too little) of current pharmaceutical and 
medical R&D are beyond the scope of this paper; the interested reader is referred to the edited volume by 




Atkinson, T. (2002) The Global Parallel Trade Outlook 2001-2006: A country-by-country 
analysis, REUTERS Business Insight, Healthcare, Spring 2002. 
 
Cutler DM and McClellan M (2001) Is technological change in medicine worth it? 
Health Affairs. Sept/Oct; pp. 11-29 
 
Giaccotto, C., Santerre, RE, and Vernon, JA (2005) “Drug Prices and R&D Investment 
Behavior in the Pharmaceutical Industry” Vol. 48, Issue 1, 195-214 2005. Journal of Law 
and Economics. 
 
Danzon, PM and Towse, A. (2002) "The Economics of Gene Therapy and 
Pharmacogenetics.. Value in Health 5(1): 5-13, 2002. 
 
DiMasi JA, Hansen RW, Grabowski HG (2003) The price of innovation: new estimates 
of drug development costs. Journal of Health Economics. 22:151-185. 
 
Drummond et al. (1997) Methods for the Economic Evaluation of Health Care 
Programmes. New York, Oxford University Press. 
 
Eisenberg, J. M. (1989)  Clinical Economics: a Guide to the Economic Analysis of 
Clinical Practices.  Journal of the American Medical Association  262(20): 2879-86 
 
FDA News PO3-89 (2003) http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2003/NEW00969.html 
(accessed on October 26, 2005). 
 
Golec, JH. and Vernon, JA (2005) “What’s at Stake in Pharmaceutical Reimportation: 
The Costs in Terms of Life Years, Lives, and Dollars.” Journal of Law and Public Policy 
16:1: 135-149. 
 
Gosling, H. 2000. European Pharmacoeconomics: The Fourth Hurdle, Global 
Pharmaceutical Reports, SMi Publishing, 2000 
 
Grabowski HG and Vernon JM (2000) The distribution of sales revenues from 
pharmaceutical innovation. Pharmacoeconomics. 18 Suppl. 1: 21-32. 
 
Jommi, C. (2001) Pharmaceutical policy and organisation of the regulatory authorities in 
the main EU countries (Collana Cergas, Centro di ricerche sulla gestione dell' assistenza 
sanitaria dell' Università Bocconi) CERGAS, Egea Publishing. 
 
Lichtenberg FR (2002) Sources of U.S. longevity increase, 1960-1997. National Bureau 
of Economic Research, working paper 8755, Cambridge, MA. 
   33 
Mattingly, S (2004) “Really Personal Medicine,” The National Journal of Technology 
Commercialization, October-November, p. 26-28.  
 
MayoClinic.com (2005) http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/thalidomide (accessed on 
November 2, 2005). 
 
Murphy KM and Topel RH (2003) The economic value of medical research; in 
Measuring the gains from medical research; edited by Kevin M. Murphy and Robert H. 
Topel, The University of Chicago Press. 
Phillips KA, Veenstra DL, Sadee W, Oren E, Lee JK. (2001) "The potential role of 
pharmacogenomics in reducing adverse drug reactions: A systematic review". JAMA, 
2001: 286 (18): 2270-2279.  
Sloan, F. ed. 1995, 2nd edition 1998.  Valuing Health Care. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Vernon JA (2003) “Simulating the impact of price regulation on pharmaceutical 
innovation.” Pharmaceutical Development and Regulation. 1(1): 55-65. 
Vernon, JA (2005) Examining the Link Between Price Regulation and Pharmaceutical 
R&D Investment. 14:1 2005: 1-17. Health Economics. 
Vernon, JA, Hughen, WK, Johnson, S, and Trujillo (2005) “Economic and 
Developmental Considerations for of Pharmacogenomic Technology” Forthcoming in 
PharmacoEconomics 
Quintiles Transnational (2004) Cited in “Personalized Medicine: The Emerging 
Pharmacogenomics Revolution,” PriceWaterHouseCoopers, Global Technology Center, 







   34 
Appendix: A Mathematical Model of Pharmacogenomic (PG) Technology 
and its Potential Impact on Drug Development 
 
This appendix describes the mathematical model from which much of our inferences and 
conclusions in the paper are derived. We consider, for simplicity, the binary case where a 
fraction of a potential patient population carries a genetic marker that signals a higher 
therapeutic response to drug therapy. The appendix contains four sub-sections: the pre-
launch  model,  the  post-launch  model,  the  NPV  model,  and  a  brief  analysis  of 
pharmacogenomic market segmentation.  
 
A.I:   Impact of PG on the Cost and Expediency of Drug Development 
 
The following notation will be used throughout the appendix: 
 
l  =   proportion of patients with genetic marker, wherel ] 1 , 0 [ Î . 
e   =   efficacy rate for patients without the genetic marker, where  ] 1 , 0 [ Î e  
d e +  = efficacy rate for patients with genetic marker, where ] 1 , 0 [ e d - Î . 
P E = pooled efficacy rate:  . ) 1 ( ) ( ld e e l d e l + = - + + = p E  
t D  = drug development costs in year t, which have the following fixed and variable cost 




t t D + D = D . 
 
The  pooled  efficacy  rate  is  the  average  efficacy  rate  over  the  entire  patient 
population; it is the efficacy rate that a traditional developmental program would have
7. 
The fixed cost component, 
F
t D , consists of all costs that are the same for traditional and 
                                                 
7 It is important to recognize that we are now using the subscript ‘p’ (for pooled) to denote the traditional 
approach of drug development.  We do this in order to reserve the subscript ‘t’ for ‘time’ (which we used in 
the paper to denote ‘traditional’) because of its expanded use in our analysis in this appendix.    35 
PG development, while the variable cost component, 
V
t D , consists of those costs that are 
different for the two developmental programs. The most likely ways the variable drug 
development costs may be affected are through clinical trials size requirements and the 
time  required  to  conduct  the  trials,  the  pharmacogenomic  diagnostic  test/tool 
development costs, and the attrition rate for developmental products.  
The  size  of  the  clinical  trials  will  be  different  for  the  two  developmental 
programs;  the  number  P N   of  patients  that  must  be  enrolled  in  the  traditional  drug 
developmental program will be greater than the number  G N  of patients that must be 
enrolled  in  the  PG  developmental  program.  This  is  because  the  number  of  patients 
enrolled in a clinical trial must be sufficient for the trial to demonstrate efficacy from a 
statistical perspective. This number depends on the true efficacy rate and the well-known 
statistical parameters a  and  b  that determine Type I and Type II errors, as discussed in 
the  paper;  as  we  show  below,  a  higher  efficacy  rate  requires  fewer  patients  to 
demonstrate statistical significance. 
Assume that a trial is designed to measure the proportion of responders to a new 
drug treatment (relative to placebo). Under the Null Hypothesis the difference in the 
proportion of responders in the treatment arm and the placebo arm is zero:  
0 : 1 2 0 = - P P H  
 
1 P   and 2 P   are  the  proportions  of  responders  in  the  placebo  and  treatment  arms, 
respectively.  For a sufficiently large number  N of patients in each arm (N>30), the 
clinical  trial  results  will  generate  a  sample  statistic, 1 2 p p p - = D ,  that  is  normally 
distributed with mean zero and standard deviation:   36 
N
P P P P ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 2 1 1 - + -
= s                 (1) 
 
Under the Alternate Hypothesis the difference in the proportion of responders is: 
 
E P P H A = - 1 2 :  
 
To simplify the analysis, we assume that the placebo response rate is 0, i.e., 0 1 = P , so 
that the Alternate Hypothesis is that the treatment arm has efficacy rate E.  If the Null 
Hypothesis were true, then the sample statistic distribution of  p D  would be centered at 0; 
if the Alternate Hypothesis were true, then the sample statistic distribution  p D  would be 
centered at E.  In either case, the standard deviation from Equation (1) is: 
N
E E ) 1 ( -
= s                   (2) 
 
For a given probability  a  of committing a Type I error, and a given probabilityb  of 
committing a Type II error, there is a unique value of N determined by the equation: 
s s b a z E z - = + 0                   (3) 
     













dx e  
 
Substituting for  s  in Equation (3), and then solving for N gives the formula for the 
number of patients required in a clinical trial to show statistical significance at the given 
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Note that N is decreasing in the efficacy , E and in each of the probabilities, a and b, as 
we might expect. In particular,  
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The total clinical trial time, T, under either traditional or PG development, should 
be an increasing function of the trial size N; patients must be screened for inclusion 
criteria, and the clinical trial itself will most likely take longer to run for more patients. 
We assume both the screening time and the trial time are proportional to the square root 
of the number of patients. On average,  l / 1  patients must be screened for every patient 
with the genetic marker that is included in the trial, and so the number of patients that 
must be screened to get N patients enrolled in the trial is l / N . Under PG development, 
there  is  also  the  additional  time,t ,  associated  with  developing  a  reliable 
pharmacogenomic test or diagnostic.  With these assumptions, the total time required to 
complete the clinical trials under each developmental programs is: 
P P P P N b a N b N a T ) ( + = + =             (5) 
t l + + = G G G N b N a T               (6) 
The use of the square root function captures the idea that there should be economies of 
scale at work, so that doubling the size will not double the time, i.e., the clinical trial time 
required is a concave down function of the size. We also make the assumption that the 
time to screen each patient for inclusion in a trial is much smaller than the time for a 
patient to undergo the actual trial: b a << , so that  p p N b T » . 
  For each developmental program, the total cost of conducting the clinical trials 
includes the cost of developing the PG diagnostic test (for the PG program), the screening   38 
costs, and the costs of running the actual trials. We assume that the unit cost per patient is 
constant over time for both the screening and trial phases; therefore, the cost of screening 
the  patients  is  proportional  to( )
2 / 3 l N ,  while  the  cost  of  running  the  actual  trials  is 
proportional to
2 / 3 N , and furthermore, we assume the unit screening cost, s, is much 
smaller than the unit cost, c, of running the actual trial. Finally, we assume the cost of 
developing the diagnostic test is also constant over time. With these assumptions, the 




P cN = D                     (7) 
( ) t l k cN N s G G
V
G + + = D
2 / 3 2 / 3               (8) 




P D < D . On the 
other hand, for values of l  near 1,  P N  and  G N  converge, but if there are positive costs 




P D < D .  However, if the screening and diagnostic test development costs are not too 




P D > D ; the reduction in clinical trial size 
under PG development will be large enough to offset the search and test development 
costs.  
For  example,  suppose  , 05 . 0 = a   , 10 . 0 = b   , 1 . 0 = e   , 15 . 0 = d   and  , 1 = c  
, 01 . 0 = s  and 0 = k , so that the screening and test development costs are negligible. The 







P D D - D , from Equations (7) and (8), is plotted below in Figure 1 as a 





P D > D  for  02 . 0 > l  or so; in fact, for  15 . 0 » l  the variable cost 
under  PG  development  is  about  70%  less  than  the  variable  cost  under  traditional 
development.  Figure  A.1  also  shows  the  percentage  change  in  clinical  trial  sizes, 
( ) P G P N N N - , which were presented in Table 1 of the paper, and which represented 
our conservative approximation of the percentage reduction in variable, out-of-pocket 




Percentage Out-of-pocket Clinical Development Cost Savings from 










0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
% of Patients with Genetic Marker
Full Model with per-unit-time costs, 
time, screening and enrollment costs. 
Conservative cost model based on
clinical trial size.  
 
 
As  s and  k  get larger relative to c, the PG variable cost will increase and the 
percentage  change  in  the  variable  costs  will  decrease.  Indeed,  if  the  screening  and 
diagnostic test development costs are large enough, then the PG variable cost will always 
be greater than the traditional variable cost, for all values ofl . However, in this case, it 
may still be possible that the length of time required to bring the drug to market is smaller   40 
under PG development.  In addition to Figure A.1, we also illustrate the percentage cost 
savings from PG (under the current model) for a range of values of d; we do this using 
the three-dimensional surface shown below in Figure A.2. 
 
Figure A.2  
 
Percentage Clinical Development Cost Reduction from PG 







 Per the discussion in the paper, because of the considerable influence that the 
opportunity cost of capital has on drug development costs, this could significantly reduce 
the  costs  associated  with  PG  development
8.    It  may  also  be  the  case  that  under  PG 
development  fewer  clinical  trials  are  required;  we  captured  this  by  scaling  the  unit 
                                                 
8 Of course, it bears reemphasizing, too, that we are not, at present, considering the impact PG will have via 


















Reduction   41 
screening and trial costs for PG development by a factor 1 < q . This will offset these costs 
and drive down the variable costs under PG development even further. 
The analysis thus far has assumed that all products successfully advance through 
the developmental pipeline.  However, the vast majority of developmental products don’t 
successfully make it to launch because of safety issues or lack of efficacy.  If  t p  is the 
probability that a developmental product advances in period t, the fraction of products 







total cost of successfully bringing a drug to launch includes the cost of the failures and 
the opportunity cost of a firm’s investment capital; the later, while exerting a significant 
influence  on  costs  because  of  the  long  development  times  associated  with  drug 
development, is, from an analysis perspective, trivial, and we assume the firms cost of 
capital to be equal to zero for now; thus, the average or expected developmental cost for 
each successful product is the following: 
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        (9) 
This expected cost decreases as the probability of advancing each period, t p , increases. 
This is perhaps most easily seen by rewriting Equation (9) as follows: 























0 ￿ ,  
and noting that each term in the sum on the right hand side is decreasing in  t p .    42 
On average, developmental products with higher efficacy or, especially, lower 
adverse event rates, are more likely to advance each period.  An important benefit of PG 
technology is that it may allow for the identification of not only patients who respond 
more efficaciously to drug therapy, but also patients who react adversely to the drug 
treatment. Thus, PG has the potential to greatly reduce adverse drug event risks, and 
thereby increase the number of drugs that make it to market.  This would not only reduce 
the cost of failures and decrease expected development costs per drug, it would also 
benefit patients who react positively to the drug treatment and who without PG would 
have been denied access (an important benefit of PG our analysis does not capture!). 
 
 A.II:     The Impact of PG on the Drug Revenues  
 
Once the drug has reached the market, revenues will be determined by the number 
of  patients  with  the  disease,  q,  and  the  unit  drug  price,p ,  that  can  be  supported  in 
equilibrium.  We  assume  this  equilibrium  price  is  determined  by  cost-effectiveness 
analyses; specifically, payers or consumers are willing to pay a higher price for a drug 
treatment that has higher benefits, according to the following relation that was discussed 






                    (10) 
 
In (10),  C D  represents the incremental disease treatment costs with a new technology 
(e.g., drug) relative to the standard of care, and  E D is the incremental efficacy of the new 
technology from some baseline treatment (e.g., the current standard of care if one exists;   43 
if  not,  the  baseline  could  be  no  treatment  at  all),  and  W  is  a  given  threshold  that 
represents payers’ maximum willingness to pay per unit efficacy.  
We assume that baseline is no treatment at all, and that the cost of care for each 
patient with the disease has two components: a fixed cost, 
F C , and a variable cost, 
V C ; 
this  variable  cost  is  not  incurred  if  treatment  with  the  drug  is  successful.  Using  our 
previous notation for efficacy, the increase in treatment cost with a PG development 
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It follows from Equation (10) that the price that can be supported in equilibrium for each 
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The  number  of  patients  receiving  treatment  is  different  under  the  two 
developmental  programs.  Under  a  traditional  developmental  program,  the  number  of 
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Note that the ratio of PG revenues to traditional revenues is no greater than 1, and it 
















  Thus,  at  least  within  the  context  of  this  simple  static  model,  the  revenues 
generated under a PG development program will never be greater than those generated 
under a traditional program. However, we have not taken into account the possibility that 
the revenues generated under a PG program may be realized sooner, and would thus have 
a higher present value, than those under a traditional program. We address this issue in 
the next section.   
 
A.III:   NPV Considerations: PG vs. Traditional Drug Development 
 
  To keep the analysis relatively simple, we assume that the fixed development 
costs
F D  are incurred at the same time for the two development programs, and that the 
variable developmental costs 
V D are incurred, and the revenuesR  are generated, at the 
time of product launch. This particular timing assumption is made for convenience and 
amounts to the assumption that the variable costs and the revenues are given in terms of 
dollars (capitalized or discounted) as of the time of product launch. This time of product 
launch will generally be different for the two programs because of the different screening 
and clinical trial times, and the time required to develop the PG diagnostic test,t . Let 
T D  be the difference in launch times for the two programs: 
   45 
t l - - - = - = D G G P G P N b N a N b T T T           (11) 
 
In (11),  P N  and  G N  are the numbers of patients required in the clinical trials under the 
two programs.  
  The revenues under the two developmental programs are generated at different 
points in time; to compare the two revenues RP and  RG we compute the present value of 
RP relative to the point in time when RG is generated, i.e., relative to the time of launch 
under PG development. For a continuously compounded discount rate r, the discount 
factor is simply the exponential of the product of negative r with the difference in launch 
times. 
Thus, by our timing assumptions, the difference in the net present value at the 











G G P G e R e R e R NPV NPV D - D + - F = D - - D - = -
D - D - D - ) ( ) (   (12) 
 
This difference is a function of the model parameters  , , , , , , , , , , , , , , b a q C k s c
V W b a t l d e  
and the appropriate discount rate r.  
 
A.IV:  PG Segmentation and Drug Development: What’s Rational? 
 
Suppose the firm could somehow ensure no inter-market arbitrages and sell the 
drug to both segments of the market, those with the genetic marker and those without the 
marker, separately; and that the price at which the drug is sold in each market segment is 
determined by the cost-effectiveness in that segment. The computations in Section A.II of 
this Appendix imply that the price p  in each segment is:  
E C
V ) ( + W = p     46 
E  is  the  efficacy  rate  in  that  segment  ( d e + = G E   for  the  segment  with  the  genetic 
marker,  e = nG E  for the segment without the marker, and  ld e + = P E  for the pooled 
population). Because the pooled efficacy rate is the average of the efficacy rates for the 
two segments, it follows that the price under traditional development is the average of the 
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Multiplying both sides by the patient population size q, we see that the revenue generated 
under traditional development is the sum of the revenues generated in each segment: 
nG G nG G P P R R q q q R + = - + = = p l p l p ) 1 (  
In other words, the revenues generated under the program in which the firm develops the 
product separately for each market segment and price discriminates based on the cost-
effectiveness in each segment are the same as the revenues under a traditional (non-
segmenting) developmental approach.  
The developmental costs, however, are likely to be very different. In fact, the 
number of patients required to show a statistically significant efficacy among the patients 
without the marker is larger than the number required among the pooled population: 
because  P nG E E = + < = ld e e , 
( ) ( ) P
P nG
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That is, the clinical trials for the non-marker segment will be larger than for the pooled 
population, and thus the clinical trial costs for the non-marker segment alone will be 
larger than the clinical trial costs for the pooled (traditional) developmental program. 
This is even more so the case if there are positive search or screening costs in finding   47 
those patients without the marker. Thus, firms won’t rationally choose to follow this 
program, and will either follow the traditional approach or one in which it develops the 
product only for those patients carrying the genetic marker. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 